

TAB B

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE ARMSTRONG PROPOSALS OF 2 AUGUST 1949

(NOTE: Comments are limited to specific recommendations on matters pertaining to ORE responsibilities. Comments are organized under Sections corresponding to the four Armstrong proposals.)

I COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Reference paragraph 4:

Mr. Armstrong assumes that CIA will establish an "Estimates Division" whereas CIA may arrive at a different organizational solution. If CIA does establish an "Estimates Division", its primary function would be the production of estimates. The coordination responsibility of research programs is a proper function of ORE's Programs Division, recently activated.

2. Reference paragraph 4a: Concur.

3. Reference paragraph 4b: Concur, provided he means Security regulations.

4. Reference paragraph 4c: Concur, within limits of security regulations of CIA.

5. Reference paragraph 4d: Concur.

6. Reference paragraph 4e: Non-concur on three counts: (a) CIA does not agree with the present definition of National Intelligence; (b) the allocations as presently established are so ill defined as to provide no suitable basis for action, and (c) "existing programs" are often used as a basis for denying support to CIA.

7. Reference paragraph 4f: Non-concur. This is not a "coordination" problem.

II PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Reference paragraph 1a: Non-concur. This is the fundamental point at issue. National Intelligence cannot be defined exclusively in terms of being interdepartmental in substance but must be defined in terms of the purpose for which it is produced and the levels at which it is to be used.

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2. Reference paragraph 1b: Concur. This point should be extended, however, to prohibit duplication of CIA intelligence activities by departmental intelligence agencies.
3. Reference paragraph 1c: Non-concur. This is based on the erroneous definition of National Intelligence mentioned in paragraph II 1 above.
4. Reference paragraph 2: Non-concur. This recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC with respect to the Dulles report. NSC 50 states that the Director and the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned.
5. Reference paragraph 3: Non-concur. Existing procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations are adequate. (Reference DCI 3/1)

III RESEARCH AND REPORTS

1. Reference paragraph 1: Concur, provided that national intelligence is properly defined.
2. Reference paragraph 2: Concur.

IV POLITICAL SUMMARIES

1. Reference paragraph 1: Non-concur. CIA publishes National Intelligence summaries, not political summaries. The CIA summaries need more information from the service departments, not less political information from the Department of State.